Products Liability - Polio Vaccine - Drug Manufacturer Strictly Liable in Tort under Restatement 402a for Failure To Warn Plaintiff Consumer of risk of Harm Attending Immunization. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. (9th Cir. 1968). by Horwick, Daniel M.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-PoLIO VACCINE-DRUG MANUFAC-
TURER STRICTLY LIABLE IN TORT UNDER RESTATEMENT 402a
FOP FAILURE TO WARN PLAINTIFF CONSUMER OF RISK OF
HARM ATTENDING IMMUNIZATION. Davis v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, Inc. (9th Cir. 1968).
In May 1962, Wyeth Laboratories was licensed1 to market the
Type III strain of Sabin oral vaccine as a prescription drug. The
following September, a report issued by the Surgeon General of the
United States revealed a causal relationship between the use of the
vaccine and the incidence of polio in those inoculated. The statistical
frequency of polio without immunization was .9 per million for those
over 20 years of age and 7.6 per million for those under 20. The
estimated occurrence of polio in those inoculated was less than one
in a million, and most of these cases were adults.2 Since the risk of
contracting the dread disease from natural causes was substantially
greater to children than to adults, and since the incidence of paralysis
resulting from inoculation with Type III vaccine was lower in children
than in the adult age group, the report recommended that use of the
vaccine be limited to children. In the spring of 1963, the Idaho Falls
Medical Society established clinics for the dispensing of this vaccine
and, notwithstanding the Surgeon General's report, included adults
within the program. Wyeth Laboratories through its agent, played an
active role in setting up the program's advertising campaign which
encouraged the community to participate. Although the package con-
taining the vaccine included data as to the risk involved, the vaccine
was administered with no warning to the participant of the hazard
inherent in its use.
In March 1963, unaware of the danger involved, Mr. Glynn
Richard Davis-a successful thirty-nine-year-old businessman enjoy-
ing good health-was inoculated at the West Yellowstone, Montana
clinic. Within thirty days following immunization, he manifested
symptoms of polio and suffered paralysis from the waist down.
Plaintiff Davis and his wife brought an action against Wyeth Labora-
tories. Following the delivery of a verdict for the defendant, plaintiff
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed and
remanded: In light of the method of dispensing Type III vaccine at
the medical clinic, and in view of the fact that the statistical prob-
1 Wyeth was licensed by the Division of Biological Standards of the National
Institute of Health.
2 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 1968).
422
RECENT CASES
abilities of contracting polio either with or without the vaccine were
approximately the same, the defendant was obligated to warn the
plaintiff of the risks attending immunization in its advertising cam-
paign, so that he could make an intelligent and voluntary choice. If
inoculation caused plaintiff's injury, the defendant was liable, either
on theories of warranty or strict liability in tort under the Restate-.
ment. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995 (9th Cir. Jan.
22, 1968) petition for rehearing pending.
Section 402a3 of the Restatement renders a seller of chattels strictly
liable for damages caused by his product when it is "defective" and
"unreasonably dangerous" without regard to the seller's lack of negli-
gence or privity of contract between himself and the purchaser.4
In Davis, the defendant argued that the rule of strict liability did
not apply because the product was not "defective." He contended
that: (1) the danger arising from the use of Type III vaccine did not
stem from any ascertainable defect or impurity in the product, and
(2) the product was manufactured exactly in the manner intended.
The term "defective" has perplexed legal writers in recent years,5
3 Noting that the courts of the forum state, Montana, had disregarded the requirement
of privity of contract in warranty actions involving food products, the Davis court
extended this exception to include products intended for intimate bodily use such as
drugs. Moreover, the court adjudged that a cause of action based on a theory of
warranty without privity is synonymous with an action grounded on a theory of strict
liability in tort and, therefore, applied section 402a of the Restatement of Torts to the
fact situation of the instant case. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995.
4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402a (1965).
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The American Law Institute, discerning the recent trend of judicial opinion toward
imposing strict liability on suppliers of chattels, either on a tort or warranty theory,
and recognizing the public's reliance upon the manufacturers and sellers of consumer
products, has promulgated the doctrine of strict enterprise liability for reasons of
public policy: Those who are best able to absorb and spread the risk of accidental injury
and damage to the consumer should bear the burden of liability. The advisors of the
American Law Institute, intending to avoid the quagmire of rules that many courts
have borrowed from commercial and contract law and traditionally applied to plaintiff's
theory of breach of warranty, have based strict liability on a theory of tort, rather than
warranty. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402a, comments c and m (1965).
Hereinafter all comment references in the text, unless otherwise indicated, refer to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a.
5 The Restatement defines a defective product as one which is "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a,
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
with one -noted jurist suggesting that the term defies any satisfactory
definition that would encompass all hypothetical situations. Avoiding
this definitional problem, the Davis court accepted Professor John W.
Wade's suggestion that the true test of strict liability under section
402a is whether the product is "unreasonably dangerous."
In some circumstances, according to the Restatement, potentially
harmful products are not "defective" nor "unreasonably dangerous."
Comment k8 of section 402a exempts from strict liability manufac-
turers and sellers of "unavoidably unsafe products" (i.e., "incapable
of being rendered safe for their intended and ordinary use") where
comment g (1965). This definition would encompass inherently dangerous products
such as the Type III vaccine involved in the Davis case. See Comment, The Manufacture,
Testing and Distribution of Harmful New Drugs: The Applicability of Strict Liability,
28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 37, 44 n.36 (1966).
During the 1961 proceedings of the American Law Institute, section 402a was in its
formative stages. At this time Professor Reed Dickerson suggested that the term
"defective" was confusing and should be eliminated. He argued that the sole criteria
for determining liability under the Restatement should be whether the product is classified
as "unreasonably dangerous," for such a product would be defective per se. Professor
William L. Prosser observed that a nondefective product such as tobacco or whiskey
may nevertheless be "unreasonably dangerous" when excessively consumed. Dean Prosser
argued that the adjective "defective" was included in section 402a in order to protect
the manufacturer from strict liability for such products. The committee rejected Dicker-
son's proposal. 38 ALI PROCEEDINGS 87-89 (1961-1962). See also Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965); Dickerson, Products Liability:
How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967).
6 Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965), the court remarked that the judicial concept of a
defective product "is a broad one. The range of its operation must be developed as the
problems arise and by courts mindful that the public interest demands consumer
protection."
7t Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, comment k:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging conse-
quences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such
a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warn-
ings, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a
physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as
to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experi-
ence, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredi-
ents, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug
nothwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
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(1) sufficient justification in terms of the public interest is shown in
favor of their commercial distribution, (2) they are labelled with
appropriate directions, and (3) "a proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it...." The Davis court recognized that the
Type III vaccine was properly classified as an "unavoidably unsafe
product" and, thus, within the scope of comment k.
Comment k does not categorically state when a duty to warn is
required. Therefore, the crucial and determinative issues in this case
were (1) whether a duty to warn existed and (2) whether the
defendant had breached this duty. In rendering its decision, the Davis
court recognized that the substantive law of Montana which governed
the case, had not settled the question of a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer's duty to warn the consumer of dangers inherent in its drug
products.
The Davis court offered a standard which would determine whether
a warning was appropriate:
When in a particular case, the risk qualitatively (e.g. of death or
major disability) as well as quantitatively, on balance with the end
sought to be achieved, is such as to call for a true choice judgment,
medical or personal, the warning must be given.9
The purpose of a warning, the court observed, is to apprise the
consumer of the risk involved. The consumer then would determine
if the benefit derived from the use of the product would justify
assumption of the risk involved. While recognizing that human
experimentation ° with new drugs is essential for the progress and-
development of scientific and medical knowledge, the Davis court
ruled that to deny the consumer the privilege of making a personal
decision with full awareness of the danger would be unconscionable:
the user would be reduced to the station of a "human guinea pig.""
9 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995.
10 Id. The court's reference to human experimentation is difficult to reconcile in
view of the evidence presented. There is no indication from the facts of the case that
the defendant Wyeth Laboratories' sale of the Type III vaccine was linked to scientific
experimentation. The Surgeon General's report revealing the risk of harm inherent in
the product's use appeared several months before the clinics were organized. Further-
more, marketing of Type III was preceded by extensive testing. Id.
New drugs have been subdivided into two categories. Before the drug is approved
by the Food and Drug Administration the new drug is denoted as "experimental." After
receiving approval, it is termed an "established" drug. Comment supra note 5, at 42-43.
Comment k recognizes this distinction; however, the determination of liability is the
same in both cases.
"1 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995. The Davis court noted the recent
trend of the allergy cases holding that a duty to warn may be necessary even when the
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The defendant contended that the chances of an adult contracting
polio were less than one in a million, and, thus there was no material
advantage to be gained by a warning. Furthermore, defendant argued,
no "true choice judgment" was present in the instant case. Since the
probability of the plaintiff's contracting polio would have been sub-
stantially increased if immunization had been foregone, human ex-
perience would indicate that he would have assumed the risk if he
had been informed of the hazard.12
product causes an adverse reaction in a very small percentage of potential consumers. In
Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 56-58 (2d Cir. 1957), the plaintiff suffered
skin irritation from use of a deodorant manufactured by defendant. Only 373 complaints
of similar injuries were known out of more than 82,000,000 jars of the product sold. In
remanding the case, the United States Court of Appeals instructed the district court to
determine whether (1) defendant, using reasonable care, could have foreseen injury to
some of the consumers of the product and (2) a warning was necessary. The Wright
court held that a duty to warn the consumer of latent dangers of which the manufacturer
has knowledge may arise irrespective of the fact that the percentage of those susceptible
to injury is minute. Furthermore, the gravity of the possible injury is a relevant factor
in addition to the statistical incidence of harm. Accord, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish,
370 F.2d 82, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1967) (duty to warn physician of foreseeable danger of
harm from use of a prescription drug may arise even though the evidence indicated
plaintiff was hypersensitive).
Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958), is the most extreme
application of the foreseeability test in determining the necessity of a warning. Despite
defendant's warning of certain possible allergic reactions, the plaintiff contracted a rare
arterial disease following her use of defendant's hair dye product. Although there were
no reported instances of any similar injury suffered by other users, the defendant was
deemed negligent in failing to warn plaintiff of this danger. Constructive knowledge
of the risk of contracting the rare disease was attributed to the defendant by presenta-
tion of evidence that scientific research had discovered a causal connection between the
occurrence of disease and the consumption of an ingredient contained in defendant's
product. One writer has criticized Braun for imposing strict liability on the manufacturer
under the guise of a negligence-foreseeability standard for what was an unforeseeable
result. Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 VAND. L. REV. 331,
333-34, 343, 367 (1959); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to
Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 55-56 (1965). The Davis court
relied on Braun, as well as Wright and Sterling in formulating its standard for determin-
ing the applicability of a warning which does not rely solely on the statistical frequency
of injury.
However, a number of cases deny plaintiff recovery on a theory of the manufacturer's
failure to fulfill its duty to warn when the plaintiff is shown to have a peculiar
idiosyncratic allergy; in these cases no warning is required. In Briggs v. National Indus.,
Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949), the plaintiff, after contracting
dermatitis following use of defendant's hair preparation, sued on the theory that defen-
dant failed to apprise plaintiff of the risk involved in the product's use. In affirming a
judgment for defendant, the California District Court of Appeal stated that the defendant
was under no obligation to warn since plaintiff did not prove that a substantial number
of persons were similarly susceptible. The rationale for denying recovery was enunciated
in Merril v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1956), where the court
said that the hypersensitive plaintiff is not reasonably foreseeable and that his hyper-
sensitivity is deemed to be the cause of the injury. Accord, Cudmore v. Richardson.
Merrell Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 643-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). Under this traditional
view it is not always clear how many other persons must have been shown to have
suffered similar reactions.
12 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995.
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Rejecting the factual basis of defendant's argument, the Davis
court noted that the geographical location in which plaintiff resided
was not an area threatened by an epidemic and that the paralytic rate
was extremely low; therefore, it concluded that the statistical prob-
abilities of the plaintiff's contracting polio from Type III vaccine or
from natural causes were approximately the same. 3 Furthermore, the
court observed that the disagreement between the Surgeon General
and the Idaho Falls Medical Society, as to whether use of the vaccine
was justified in view of the attending risk, indicated the presence of
a "true choice judgment."'14 Moreover, the court declared that the
vaccine was designed to prevent the occurrence of polio, not to relieve
or to cure those already afflicted. In the latter instance, risks would
be more readily countenanced. 5 Reviewing the evidence of the case,
the Davis court held that a duty to warn was a necessary adjunct to
the commercial marketing of the Type III vaccine. 6
Proceeding to the question of whether the defendant breached its
duty to warn, the court acknowledged that -when the Type III vaccine
was first marketed, the defendant was not obligated to warn of the
danger inherent in its product, since the risk of harm was unknown.'
While declining to specify the precise date when defendant was
charged with a duty to warn, the court held that by March 1963-
when the plaintiff was immunized-medical science had confirmed
the existence of a danger, thereby dictating a warning.18
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. The Davis court did not offer any reasons to support its conclusions that
inherent risks of harm are more acceptable when a drug product is designed to cure
or relieve the diseased victims. While each case must be adjudicated on the merits of its
particular factual situation, it seems that prevention of disease carries as great a social
value as cure or alleviation.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. It is well settled that the manufacturer can be held to a duty to warn only
when he is deemed to have knowledge of the specific danger. However, actual knowl-
edge of the risk of harm is not required; constructive knowledge can be attributed
to the manufacturer. Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 996-97 (D.N.D.
1966); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.S.D. 1967). The
rationale of imputing constructive knowledge to the manufacturer is that "a person
who undertakes such manufacturing will be held to the skill of an expert in that
business and to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, and processes. Thus, he
must keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries touching his
product." 2 F. HARPER & P. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (1956). See Wright v.
Carter Prods., 244 F.2d at 59.
Comment j is consistent with this view and requires either actual or constructive
knowledge of the risk involved in the consumption of the product before a duty to
warn will obtain. The Davis court did not have the issue of constructive knowledge
before it because in March 1963, the defendant was aware of the hazard accompanying
the use of the Type III vaccine.
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The defendant argued that its disclosure of the danger to the
medical society by its agent satisfied its obligation to warn. The court
conceded that ordinarily a prescription drug manufacturer's warning
to a physician of the risk of harm is sufficient, 9 but found that the
instant factual situation was readily distinguishable. While Type III
vaccine was nominally denoted as a prescription drug, the manner in
which it was dispensed was more akin to that of a drug sold over-
the-counter. In the impersonal, assembly line atmosphere of the clinic,
the individual medical attention that is characteristic of the doctor-
patient relationship was lacking.20 Thus, only a warning directed to
the consumer of the vaccine would fulfill Wyeth Laboratories' duty to
warn. 2 However, Wyeth had not fulfilled this legal duty since: (1)
the defendant's only warning was a written insert enclosed in the
vaccine containers, (2) the defendant was aware that its notices were
not being transmitted to those inoculated, and (3) the defendant
actively participated in the advertising campaign that promoted the
clinic's program.22
While the Davis court professed acceptance of the doctrine of
strict liability as provided by section 402a, it did not specifically apply
the criteria mentioned in comment j23-the only explanatory comment
in section 402a offering a standard to determine when a warning is
needed. While there are some similarities between the comment j
19 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995. See Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 350-53, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327-28 (1963); Krug v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 151-52 (Mo. 1967); Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 P. Supp.
897, 899 (D.D.C. 1963). While a manufacturer generally is charged with the legal
obligation to warn the foreseeable user of the dangerous propensities of its product, an
exception is made where an intervenient agent administers or prescribes it on an indi-
vidual basis. Prescription drugs fall within this exception. Rheingold, Products Liabil-
ity--The Ethical Drug AManujacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 937, 985-87
(1964); see also Freedman, Prescription or Ethical Drugs: Fallacies as to Warranties,
Failure to Warn and Strict Liability in Tort, 21 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 599 (1966).
20 Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 20,995.
21 Id. The court observed that the defendant could have reasonably been expected
to use one of several means at his disposal to insure that notice of the inherent risk in-
volved in immunization with Type III vaccine reached the plaintiff. Posters situated in
the clinic, advertisements, releases of liability to be signed by those inoculated, or oral
communication from the personnel of the clinic to the plaintiff would have been effective
methods by which defendant Wyeth could have discharged its duty to warn.
22 Id. It is not clear from the Davis opinion whether defendant's participation-
through its agent-in organizing the clinics and encouraging the public to undergo
immunization through an advertising campaign was a crucial factor in the court's
determination that defendant had breached its duty to warn as a matter of law. The
-Davis court -seems to emphasize the importance of defendant's role in the program
as evidence that it was aware that its warning to the clinic -was not being relayed to
those persons who were inoculated.
23 RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn) oF TORTS § 402a, comment i (1965).
[Vol. 5
RECENT CASES
approach and the Davis test,24 they seem to differ as to the purpose
of a warning. Comrent j.concludes:
Where warning is given, seller-may reasonably assume that it will
be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is
safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.2 5
This excerpt indicates that the purpose of a warning is to render the
product safe for consumption: If the warning is observed, and if
those endangered would refrain from using the product, the product
is not "unreasonably dangerous."
In contrast, the Davis court held that when the product is "un-
avoidably unsafe," the purpose of notice is to inform the consumer
of the hazards in the product's use and thus afford him the opportu-
nity to make an intelligent and voluntary choice whether to assume
the attendant risk.
Although comment j refers to all products, 6 while the Davis test
applies only to "unavoidably unsafe products," these differing legal
standards may sometimes have the same effect when the product is
known to imperil an ascertainable group of persons. Under the com-
ment j approach a warning is appropriate since it will ipso facto
render the product safe for use. If the risk of injury balanced with
the value to society were to present a "true choice judgment," Davis
would also require a warning.
When, as in Davis, the "unavoidably unsafe product" presents a
foreseeable danger to physiologically unidentifiable consumers, the
application of these two standards yields contrary conclusions. In this
factual situation it would be nearly impossible to deter those potential
consumers who would be injured by use of the product. Since admoni-
tion of the danger would not make use of the product safe, no warn-
ing would be required by comment j. However, where the factual
pattern presents a "true choice judgment," Davis would require a
warning in order to apprise the consumer of the risk involved.
Comment k does not offer a definitive standard for determining
the necessity of a warning. It requires a warning only "where the
24 Comment j requires a warning where: (1) the seller has actual or constructive
knowledge of the danger involved, (2) the danger is not known to the public, or if
known, is not expected by potential consumers to be present in the seller's product, and
(3) a substantial number of persons may be expected to suffer an adverse reaction or
where the product is "unduly dangerous."
The Davis court's emphasis on the qualitative and quantitative risks seems to parallel
the criteria of comment j.
25 REsrATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, comment j (1965).
26 Id.
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situation calls for it." Thus, it is arguable that the authors of the
Restatement intended that the appropriateness of notice under com-
ment k should be interpreted in light of comment j; explanatory
comments to a particular Restatement section should be construed in
pari materia. If this construction were accepted, it would foreclose
use of a warning whenever an "unavoidably unsafe product" was
found to be inherently dangerous to consumers whose physiological
susceptibility was not detectable. 7 This would contradict the holding
in Davis.
The hypothetical illustration found in comment k describes the
Pasteur rabies vaccine. Since consumers vulnerable to an adverse
reaction are unascertainable, the rabies vaccine is analogous to the
Type III vaccine in Davis. The Restatement declares that this product
is not "unreasonably dangerous" when it is marketed with a warning
of the risks attending its use.28 Thus, it may be hypothesized that
comment k does not impliedly refer to the provisions of comment j;
rather it reflects a tacit acceptance of the concept that a warning
accompanying a product denoted as "unavoidably unsafe" is intended
to inform the consumer of the inescapable hazard.
The significance of Davis lies in its formulation of a test for judging
the necessity of a warning and its declaration of the public policy
argument underlying the seller's duty to warn. In view of the remark-
able progress of recent scientific research accompanying the modern
phenomenon of mass immunization clinics, it is likely that Davis v.
Wyeth will presage the appearance of similar factual patterns.
Whether a warning to the ultimate consumer is necessary will devolve
upon a balancing of potentially contrary public policy considerations:
(1) the individual's right to be informed, and (2) the achievement
of a public health objective which might be frustrated if a warning
were to deter potential consumers. The initial decision to warn is
determined by the drug manufacturer when the product is marketed
and this responsibility places it in a difficult position. As a member
of the private economy, accustomed to thinking primarily in terms
of sales in a competitive marketplace, the pharmaceutical firm is
required to answer what is essentially a public policy question.
DANIEL M. HoRwcK
27 See Note, Products Liability and Section 402a of the Restatement of Torts, 55
GEO. LJ. 286, 313 n.153 (1966), where it is suggested that a warning may only be
required by comment k where it would render the "unavoidably unsafe product" safe
for use.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, comment h (1965).
